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This is an attempt to analyze the role of government in integrated rural development. With limited 
data available thus far, Korea's Saemaul Undong is examined as an example of integrated rural 
development. III its ideals, this movement indeed represents a model of integrated rural development 
program. Yet, in its implementation, Korean government has taken a leading role, first initiating it 
and later supporting it in financial and technical assistance terms. This paper argues that the role of 
government has become almost ubiquitously significant in today's world, whether ill the more or less 
developed parts of the globe. In the case of Korea, the structural features, primarily traditional in its 
origin, have made it more feasible, if not entirely inevitable, for government to take an active role in 
this respect. By examining the first few years of results of this movement, which in quantitative terms 
is an outstanding success, this paper tries to show some crucial structural issues that need to be 
considered very seriously in order for the movement to continue its success and to become an excellent 
model of ideally integrated rural development. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Regardless of one's ideological predilections, it has generally become apparent to social 
scientists that government is pervasive in social change :everywhere. As LaPalombara has 
put it, exhaustive documentation is scarcely needed "to demonstrate that major changes 
in both the developed and developing nations are inconceivable today without the massive 
intervention of government. "1 Particularly, in the contemporary context of modernization 
and development among ithe relatively less prosperous countries, "a strong state is the 
sine qua non" of change. 2 
On the most general level, the historical trend of enlarged government involvement in 
social change may be explained as a structural requirement necessitated by the increased 
structural complexity and functional differentiation due to the widespread industrialization 
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1. J. LaPalombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," in J. LaPalo-
mbara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963), p. 4. 
2. R.H. Lauer, Perspectives on Social Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973), p. 157. Also, 
LaPalombara, op. cit. 
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and modernization. The need for coordination and integration caused by these processes 
has augmented the role of government. 3 
Of course, the role of govenment as an agent of deliberate change or planned. change 
has expanded most starkly in the present century, and especially in many societies which 
started rather late in the world-wide surge for modernization and development. 4 Once 
exposed to the advanced economies, the "demonstration effect" has pushed up the level of 
aspirations among the poorer nations. And with limited resources and technologies, these 
countries have been almost forced to turn to a strong state and greater government inter-
vention in order to achieve rapid economic growth and modernization. 5 
Nevertheless, the role of government is not always positive in social change. Govern-
ment can be a barrier to, as well as a driving force for change. The determining factor in 
this regard may be found in the basic orientations of the g9yernment and the political 
elite and in the structural characteristics of the society. 
For instance, a government may represent the)nterest of the most powerful and the 
most privileged of the society. In this case, it may resist any significant change in the 
structure of power and resource allocation, which may threaten the status quo. In fact, 
many states in the past and still some in the present have been so oppressive with respect 
to the peasant that government-directed change programs have often been met with sus-
picion, resistance, or at least apathy on the part of peasant population. Some of these 
programs may have been conceived by the governments with genuine' desire to help im-
prove the lot of the people. On the other hand, however, examination of history also indica-
tes that government has never been the disinterested 'bystander in social change, sometimes 
taking an active role of initiator and sometimes a passive role of supporter of various 
change efforts in diverse spheres of social life by divergent groups in society. The activity 
of government may often have benefited some select segments of society, but it is a potent 
source of change and much of the nature and direction of change in a society with a strong 
central government must be understood in terms of the activity of that government. 6 This 
has aroused a debate about whether a strong centralized state is necessarily an authorita-
rian state or it could also be a democratic one. 7 
Authors have suggested certain factors necessitating a strong government which is au-
thoritarian to be more effective than a democratic state to achieve modernization. For 
instance, a need for authoritarianism is recognized in the early stages of development. 8 
Or, some essential functions of :development require a strong government: They may be 
a) creation of the physical and social foundations for development; b) overall planning 
and integration of development; or c) to bring about larger and more efficient production 
and distribution of goods and services. 9 Or, the role of the government is likely to vary 
3. W.E. Moore, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974). 
4. Ibid., p.2. 
5. Guerreiro-Ramos, A., "Modernization: Towards a Possibility Model," in W. A. Belling and 
G.O. Totten, eds. Developing Nations: Quest for a Model (New York: Van Nostrand Rein-
hold), pp. 21-59. 
6. Lauer, op. cit., pp. 154-157. 
7. For the authoritarian argument, see LaPalombara, op. cit., and R. Heilbroner, The Future 
as History (New York: Harper, 1959). For the democratic argument, see W. McCord, The 
Springtime of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1<165). For a general discussion 
of the issue, Lauer, op. cit., pp. 157-159. 
8. R.E. Ward, "Authoritarianism as a Factor in Japanese Modernization." in J.L. Finkle and 
R.W. Gable eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: Wiley, 1966). 
9. E. Staley, "The Role of the State in Economic Development," in M. Weiner, ed., Moder-
nization: The Dynamics of Growth (New York: Basic Book, 1966). 
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depending on the range of ends and the level of· aspirations, the speed of growth to be 
achieved, the nature of the factor and resource endowments, the nature and degree of 
institutional impediments, and the relative "backwardness" of the economy.10 
. Useful as they may be, these arguments tend to neglect very important structural factors 
which may contribute to an authoritarian approach to development. Some societies may be 
more amenable, by tradition, to an authoritarian political culture. Especially in the inci-
pient phase of development, the transformation of such structural pre-conditions may 
entail enormous social and economic costs which may retard certain urgent changes badly 
needed and aspired after by the society. Instability may be one of such costs incurred in 
the process. 
On the other hand, however, the development program in itself may embrace inculca-
tion of social-political change conducive to democratic structures while pursuing other 
more urgent changes. In a case like this, then, a strong central government, with an 
authoritarian orientation, may be more effective in initiating and implementing major 
development programs without necessarily sacrificing the socio-political transformation 
entailing democratization. This certainly requires an "integrated" approach to development. 
South Korea's Saemaul Undong (the New Community Movement) offers an intriguing 
.case material for analysis in this respect. Therefore, our main purpose in this study is: 1) 
to examine the structural factors affecting the active involvement of the central government 
with an authoritarian orientation in integrated rural development; and 2) to analyze the 
structural implications of the governmental involvement in such a program. 
II. THE SAEMAUL UNDONG AS INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
In our view, the concept of integrated rural development entails several essential char-
acteristics, largely conceived in terms of ideal goals. This goal-oriented approach is taken 
.on the ground that development as a general concept is a value-laden concept. ll First of 
all, integrated development is a comprehensive change. It is to enhance change in all of the 
social, economic, cultural, and political spheres of institutions. It should involve all 
segments of the community system. Second, it is a balanced change. It must encourage 
.change in all of the strata, sectors, and regions of the society, an even or similar pace within 
the community as well as among the communities in the larger society. Third, integrated 
development, it follows, is to be a change with meaningful linkages among these diverse 
:strata, sectors, and regions. All of the above, of course, require a coordinated and concer-
ted effort at development. And finally, on a different dimension, it calls for active volun~ 
tary participation by the members of the community and the larger society.12 
We contend that, though in no way perfectly fit, Korea's Saemaul Undong embodies 
.all of these integrated developed goals. And it is a fact that in this newest nation-wide 
10. A. Eckstein, "Individualism and the Role of the State in Economic Growth," Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, VI (Jan. 1958). 
11. Kyong-Dong Kim, "Toward a Sociological Theory of Development: A Structural Perspec-
tive," Rural SOCiology, Vol. 38 (4), (Winter 1973), pp. 462-476; H.K. Geiger, "Societal De-
velopment: Notes on the Vestments ofa Concept," in G.M. Beal eta!., eds., Sociological Per-
spectives of Domestic Development (Amos, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1971) pp. 45-69; 
G. Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York: the Twentieth Century Fund, 1968); and Dudly Seers, 
"The Meaning of Development, : The Agricultural Development Council, reprint(Sept. 1970). 
12. Kyong-Dong Kim, "Toward a Theory of Integrated Rural Development: A Humanistic 
Perspective," paper presented to the Fourth World Congress for Rural Sociology, Torun, 
Poland,August 9-13, 1976; A.E. Havens, "Quest for Societal Development, "in G.M. Beal 
et al., op. cit., pp. 70-93. 
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movement, Korean government has played a crucial role. Therefore, this paper will dem-
onstrate that the Saemaul Undong is a form of integrated rural development, 'oy briefly 
describing its main features. Then, it will attempt to analyze the major sociological factors 
that have led to active government involvement. And finally, we will assess the role of 
government in this particular development effort by examining its effect. It should be 
noted at this point that due to the relatively short history of this movement dearth of 
comprehensive and reliable empirical data is a barrier for any detailed analysis. Also, 
for the sake of parsimony, we will need to be concise in our description and analysis. 
In a nutshell, South Korea's Saemaul Undong is defined as follows: "The Saemaul Un-
dong is a community development movement aimed at improvement of the economic, so-
cial, and cultural life of the people and their environmental conditions, through inculcation 
of attitudes and values of diligence, cooperation, and self-help, cultivation of grass-roots 
leadership, and through the active voluntary participation of the people in the community. 
As such, it is a comprehensive social movement which is an integral part of the national 
modernization effort to achieve stable and balanced development of the nation. 13 
Chart 1. Goals for the Saemaul Undong 
MODERNIZATION OF THE NATION 
MODERNIZATION OF THE COMMUNITIES 
Spiritual Development 
(Attitudinal Change) 
l. Inculcation of 
upright values 
2. Materialization of the spirit 
of self-reliance, self-help, 
and cooperation 
3. Establishment of firm na-
tional concept and national 
identity 
4. Rationalization or scientific 
way of life 
5. Cultivation of wholesome 
and fresh attitudes to life 
(SAEMAUL UNDONG) 
Economic Development 
(Modernization of Agriculture 
and Industrialization) 
1. Income rise 
2. Innovation of agriculture and 
fishery structure 
Social Development 
(Cultural Change) 
l. Nation-wide electrification, 
road pavement, & complete 
communication facilities 
2. Equipment of cultural facili-
ties (home) 
3. Technical innovation and me- 3. Equipment of cultural faciliti-
chanization of production es (community) 
4. Re-adjustment of cultivating 
land and enlargement of the 
cultivating scale 
5. Processing of agricultural and 
fishery products 
4. Innovation of the community-
structure 
5. Expansion of social security-
and welfare system 
Source: National Agricultural Economics Research Institute, op. cit .• p. 22. 
Obviously, this definition about covers almost all of the goals of ideal integrated devel-
opment as defined above. But in the actual process of realizing these lofty goals, there 
are practical considerations to be made in terms of priorities, sequences, and adjustments. 
In the incipient stage of this movement, therefore, there was an interesting combination 
of priority choices. On April 22, 1970, in a gathering of provincial governors and mayors 
to discuss the policies to deal with drought disaster, President Park Chung Hee of the-
Republic delivered a speech which was to become the original kindling for the Saemau[ 
Undong. He said Farmers who lament over their miserable fortune, who reproach the 
government for their poverty, and who blame others for their poverty can neyer stand up··· 
13. National Agricultural Economics Research Institute, A Study of the Saemaul Undong and' 
Structural Change of Korean Rural Society (in Korean: NAERI Research Report Series no. 
68, July 1975), p.7. 
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If we all work hard to nurture our own village with our own two hands, with the spirit 
of self~help and self-reliance, lam confident that all our villages will soon turn out to be 
prosperous and tidy communities. We might as well call this movement the Saemaul (new 
community) Nurturance Movement. "14 Note that in this remark there is a desire and 
urgency to eradicate rural poverty closely blended with the need to enhance the attitudinal 
element of self-help and self-reliance. There is also a concern over the environmental 
conditions of rural life. 
Now, the question was implementation of these ideas into action. Since the most urgent-
ly needed goal of immediate concern was to close the income gap between the rural and 
urban sectors, the very first pilot project proposed and executed on a nation-wide scale 
was to mobilize the idle rural populace during the off-season to engage in village 
improvement tasks with respect to tidying up the physical environment for the sake of 
utility and convenient living and creation of productive bases. Implicit in this pilot project 
was the attempt to test the water in regard to the possibility of arousing the attitude of 
self-help and the enthusiasm for voluntary participation on the part of the villagers. Thus, 
for the first time in the history of this nation, government distributed 335 cost-free bags 
of cement to each of approximately 32,000 villages around the country, during the period 
of October 1970 and June 1971. The cost of the cement alone amounted to around eleven 
million dollars. Each and every village was then urged to strive for the best use of the 
cement to build roads, bridges, banks of the river, retaining walls,' or community laundry 
facilities. At the end of this initial nine-month period, when the government estimated the 
total output, it was elated to find out that the values of these village improvement works 
turned out to be nearly three times the initial investment, $32,600,000. 15 
However, the evaluation revealed a hitch in this effort; this enormous result was not 
achieved evenly among all the participating villages. Further analysis indicated that the 
quality of indigenous viilage leadership was crucial in the success or failure in the first pilot 
project. At this point, upon the request of President Park, a comprehensive plan for a 
new nation-wide movement was drawn up and at the acceptance of the plan by the 
President it came to be the master framework of the Saemaul Undong.16 
Reflecting the lesson learned from the trial project, one of the first main features of this 
movement was to establish the Farmers Training Center, later re-named as the Saemaul 
Leaders Training Institute, in January 1972. The principal objective of this Institute is 
to induce changes in the attitudes and values of Saemaulleaders by infusing the Saemaul 
spirit, rather than imparting of technical information regarding agriculture.l7 
The next central consideration that entered into the plan was to mobilize human and 
material resources without coercive measures; it required an organizational strategy. Since 
we will touch upon the administrative apparatus of the government in the next section, 
we will focus on the grass-roots of organization in this context. This involves two aspects 
of organization: cooperative community participation and grass-roots democracy, on the 
one hand, and cultivation of indigenous leadership, on the other. 
In order to assure cooperative and voluntary participation, careful analysis of the tra-
ditional structural characteristics of Korean society was made. It was recognized that the 
family and kinship ties are still very strong and intact, despite the rapid socio-economic 
transformation experienced in the past few decades. Korean culture happens to possess a 
symbol system of the language in which a very significant collectivistic orientation is per-
14. Korean Overseas Information Service, Saemaul Undong (Seoul: 1973), p. 57; and Ministry 
of Home Affairs, Saemaul Undong, (Seoul: 1974, in Korean,) p.639. 
IS. Minist.ry of Home Affairs, pp. cit., pp. 23-24. 
16. Ibid., p.24. 
17. Ibid., pp. 118-124. 
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meating in a subtle yet forceful manner. Koreans tend to use the subject "we" in lieu of 
"I" even in many contexts in which such an expression is logically incorrect. For instance, it 
is not strange at all to hear an only child referring to "our" parents or a husband with 
one wife speaking of "our" wife, in addition to the very common usage of "our" home, 
school, community, etc. Furthermore, confining to rural communities, Korea has a long 
and persistent tradition of cooperative efforts in the social, political, cultural, and econo-
mic spheres. Hyang- Yak. a community contract system, used to handle the community-
wide issues of ethical and moral nature, and in some cases, various social problems. A 
variety of voluntarily formed mutual-aid cooperatives have existed for economic and 
financial exigencies; these were called Kye for diverse purpose. Labor exchange and coop-
erative farm and non-farm activities have been quite prevalent. Village assemblies (Dong-
Hoe) managed political matters, while village rituals (Dong-Je) and kinship-oriented ances-
tor worship ceremonies have been responsible for religious, social integrative functions. IS 
Somehow throughout the ages, no political regime took these indigenous traditional 
community organizations seriously. But the planners of the Saemaul Undong were deter-
mined to exploit them in the positive direction. Yet, in order to utilize such indigenous 
structural bases for the purpose of social mobilization, a new approach to grass-roots lead-
ership was required. Administratively, Korean society has been organized and operated 
by the principle of centralization. At the base of this hierarchical organization in rural 
areas is the Li (village) chief, theoretically appointed by the central government, although 
the actual selection may still lie in the hands of the higher-level officials in the immediate 
locality. Chosen from among the village residents, the Li chief carries out whatever nation-
al programs handed down from the central government through the hierarchy of au-
thority. He also serves as the chairman of the Li development committee composed of 
village representatives chosen by the villagers and approved by the Li chief himself. 19 
This type of villagers leadership inherently entailed a difficulty of the age-old mistrust 
and indifference among the residents towards any bureaucratic officials, including their own 
neighbor, the Li chief. 20 Encountered with this obstacle, a new type of leadership was to be 
promoted for the Saemaul Undong. Saemaul leaders are to be selected from among the 
villagers themselves by an assembly of electors representing every household in the com-
munity. This was to inject new vitality into the social organization of the community. 
Since they are not part of the bureaucratic hierachy but "their own people," they are to 
become the center of volutary participation and democratic decision-making on the grass-
roots level. In effect, this arrangement was to reflect the traditional, though rudimentary, 
form of village democracy and cooperation. 21 
In each village, there are one male and one female Saemaulleaders, to insure division 
of labor along the sex line. But to make sure this approach works for the benefit of the 
community and the broad ideals of this movement, specific guidelines were provided for 
the selection of the leaders, and the selected leaders have been undergoing constant training 
at the central Training Institute mentioned earlier and by incessant reminders through 
18. Korean Rural Sociological Association, Rural Sociology (Seoul: Minjosa, 1965, ·in Korean); 
Korean Overseas Information Service, op. cit .• pp. 18-20; and Man-Gap Lee, The Social 
Structure of Korean Village and Its Change (Seoul; Seoul National University Press, 1973, in 
Korean). 
19. Byong Man Ahn, "A Study of Development of the Rural Community in Korea, ".(in Korean) 
unpublished Master's thesis (Seoul National University, Seoul, 1967), pp. 15-21. 
20. Korean Rural Sociological Association, op. cit .. and V.S.R. Brandt, "Socio-Cultural Aspects 
of Political Participation in Rural Korea, " paper presented to· the Conference on Political 
Participation in Korea, University of Washington, Seattle, February 1975. 
21. Korean Overseas Information Service, op. cit." and Ministry of Home Affairs, Saemaul 
Undong Guidelines (Seoul, 1975, in Korean), pp. 1062-1065. 
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Tegular local and national conferences. The qualities of competent SaemauHeaders expected 
and repeatedly reinforced include thorough inculcation of the Saemaul spirit of diligence, 
cooperation, and self-help, exemplary to the fellow villagers by demonstrating integrity 
and self-sacrificing attitude; trustworthiness; persuasive ability with self-confidence; pio-
neering spirit and creativity; a strong sense of mission with the consciousness of collective 
destiny; and democratic outlook. 22 
Because they are not paid bureaucrats, their self-sacrificing, altruistic, compassionate, 
and collectivistic orientation is most intensely stressed. Nonetheless, their service does not 
go without rewards and compensation. To successful and effective Saemaulleaders, incen-
tives are offered in numerous ways, besides, of course, their own personal satisfaction of 
leadership and achievement. Often, Saemaulleadership is a direct and most effective short-
cut to national status in the political and bureaucratic arena. Honorific awards with 
prizes and national acclaim are offered to exceptionally good leaders. They may enjoy 
privileges of discounted rates for official trips. They can qualify for special loans from the 
government for deserving personal businesses or projects. They may obtain direct financial 
assistance from the government for the education of their children. And last but not least 
important from the point of view of the efficiency in carrying out the Saemaul programs, 
they have the privilege of not having to rely on the regular administrative channel for 
communication, to avoid the red-tape. Direct contact is available up to the provincial 
governors and ministers in case certain urgent grievances or business matters are needed to 
be heard. 23 
Now, let us briefly discuss the substantive elements and the processual dynamics of this 
movement. Under the broad goals of spiritual development or attitudinal innovation, 
economic development or modernization of agriculture and industrialization, . and social 
development or cultural innovation (see Chart 1 for details), this movement encompasses 
a horde of specific action programs. These programs are categorized into six major classes: 
1) basic Saemaul nurturance projects chiefly oriented to environmental improvements; 2) 
projects to create productive economic bases, covering such areas as farmland, irrigation, 
farm roads, communication facilities, financial and marketing facilities, fishery facilities, 
and other cooperative trial projects; 3) projects to increase income through agricultural 
improvement, cooperative farming and other productive activities, Saemaul factories, 
other non-farm activities including fishing, and specialized cash crop farming; 4) affores-
tation and forest management; 5) welfare programs embracing housing construction and 
improvement, relocation projects, mobile public health facilities, projects for isolated 
islets and archipelago, and other special area projects; and 6) attitudinal innovation 
and change-in-life-style projects which include promotion of savings, family planning and 
women's classes, diet innovation, child-care centers, college students' service programs, 
training and education of Saemaul leaders and other related personnel in every sphere, 
technical information dissemination, and other public relations activities. 24 
This hmgthy list is merely intended to demonstrate comprehensiveness of the movement 
in substantive terms. It is truly a multipurpose, multifaceted program. But the question 
here is how such diverse programs are organized, selected, and executed . .once again, the 
direct role of the government will be deferred for later discussion. One very illuminating 
approach by the planners, however, is found in the classifacatory and sequential process. 
In the course of execution of this movement, they came to recognize the need for a typo-
logical and stage-wise approach in view of the characteristics of each village. Its central 
22. 'Ibid. 
23. Informal accounts gathered through conversations and newspaper reports. 
24. National Agricultural Economics Research Institute, op. cit.. p. 22; and Ministry· of Home 
Affairs, op. cit. (1974), pp. 1-26-137. 
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tenet was to assess the degree of self-preparedness of each community and prom<:>te pro-
grams most appropriate to the situation. No doubt, the most obvious criterion o( t.4is pre-
paredness was the availability of common funds to be expended for certain speci~9 proj-
ects. However, strong emphasis was placed on other qualities of the village, such as indig-
enous leadership, organizational readiness, and most importantly, the willingness of the 
people to improve their own lot and their determination to become self-sufficient., Accor-
ding to these criteria, three main types of villages were identified: Basic( or undeveloped) 
villages; Self-helping (developing) villages; and Self-Reliant, Self-Sufficient (or developed) 
villages. 25 
The basic yet undeveloped villages, which are considered to lack leadership, organization. 
and essential indigenous resources, are to require educational and financial assistance from 
the government to initiate self-help projects. The emphasis in this case is placed on relati-
vely simple and basic programs of environmental betterment and creation of necessary 
infrastructure for further development. The self-helping or currently developing. villages 
are urged to be primarily concerned with expansion of infrastructure and increase of 
income. Even though these are the villages equipped with the necessary leadership and 
organizational capability to identify and carry out the basic village improvement projects, 
they still are in need of financial resources to materialize them, and hence of some govern-
mental support. And finally, the self-reliant villages are expected to be able to raise their 
level of income substantially and move on to welfare-type programs. These villages are 
recognized for their success in the basic environmental improvement tasks initially started, 
in the economic growth projects taken up subsequently, and even in achieving some 
degree of financial viability to enable them to go ahead with further development projects 
of their own choice on their own.26 
From the above observation, it is to be emphatically noted that there is a shift of 
emphasis on varying types of specific programs depending on the characteristics of the 
villages involved. And this identification and recognition of village-specific features and 
readiness constitutes the underlying theme of selection projects on the community level. To 
fulfill the ideal of voluntarism crucial to the whole movement, each village is charged with 
the responsibility for the selection as well as execution of specific tasks. At the outset, the 
Saemaulleader is urged to make all the decisions in this regard on the basis of general 
consensus among the members of the community as much as possible. The selection of the 
project should be made always in connection with commonly felt needs and deeply expressed 
concerns of the village residents themselves. Unique ecological, economic, social, and 
other characteristics of each community ought to be taken into account to insure realistic 
decisions. All this effort reflects the desire of the national leaders to provide a training 
ground not only for community unity and integration but also for democratic decision-
making and voluntary participation. 27 
What fruits has this movement thus far reaped, how effectively, will be shortly examin-
ed. But in all this, what has the government been doing needs be briefly analyzed. 
III. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
As might have already been grasped, perhaps still indirectly, by the disc.ussion above, 
Korean government has not merely been the igniting force and active initiator but also a 
helpful partner in this movement. However, our main interest in this discussion does not 
25. Ministry of Home Affairs, op. cit. (1974), pp. 28-29; and Korean Oversc;~sJnformation 
Service, op. cit .• pp. 46-48. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Korean Overseas Information Service, op. cit .• pp. 32-36. 
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lie in detailed description of such roles. Instead, we will try to show what sort of sociolo-
gical (actors have brought about such a decision on the part of government. In doing this, 
it seems necessary to go into an overview of the historical background and major structural 
pre-conditions of Korean society. 
Korea, historically, has been an agrarian society, with much of its social structural and 
cultural ramifications. The mass of peasantry, while having been the mainstay of produc-
tive force, seems to have always been the most suffered element of the society. They were 
exploited by the ruling gentry class in the pre-modern era, again by the Japanese colonial 
policies during the pre-war period. Despite the unprecedented effort by the independent 
republic to reform the traditional-colonial land tenure system, the war of 1950-53 and the 
hasty recovery from its aftermaths still had left the rural sector in the backwater of 
change. The sixties has been marked by a frantic attempt to industrialize the economy 
and in fact, Korea has achieved remarkable growth in this decade. This has been led by 
the manufacturing sector of the industry, which, in turn, was supported by skyrocketing 
rise in exports. In the heat of tremendously rapid industrialization, however, the agricul-
tural sector and the rural communities have once more been left behind.28 
Although we reject the popularly held notion that peasants and farmers are inherently 
unwilling and unable to better their own life, their lack of motivation, their deep sense of 
mistrust towards outsiders and particularly officials, their apathy and indifference, their 
apparent resistance to change, especially induced from the outside, and the whole other 
gamut of negativism and passivism can be readily understandable under the circumstances. 
And this has been no exception iri Korea29• 
This might have been one of the reasons why many previous rural development pro-
grams have been anything but failure. Yet, this very tendency of passivity is the fundamental 
source of the necessity to exert external intervention. No doubt, this external agent needs 
not be confined to the government; it can be any outside force. We will, therefore, attempt 
to identify some major factors to explain the reason why, in Korea, the government, 
in part, has had to take the initiative and, in part, has been the most appropriate agent for 
such an active role. 
To begin with, some broad generalizations may be made regarding the traditional struc-
tural and cultural orientations that have been prevalent in Korean society. One of the 
most influential factors that have affected the nature of social structure and ideology of 
human relationship has been Confucianism. This has inculcated in this society, among 
others, authoritarian personality, hierarchical social relationships, and elitism, confounded 
by moralistic obligation and collective particularism embodied in the strong kinship ties 
and familism. 30 
These features have been then translated into the political culture. The power structure 
and administrative-bureaucratic organizations are highly centralized. Due to the moralistic 
approach to politics rather than professionalism, this culture favors strong leadership of 
benevolent paternalistic quality. Because of the tightly knit social structural tendencies, 
open conflict is shunned lest it may be disruptive and violent. Even though pouplar parti-
28., Kyong-Dong Kim, "Social Change in South Korea," Journal of Korean Affairs. Vol. 4, No. 
4 (January 1975), pp. 3-15. 
29, E.R. Wolf, Peasants (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1966); J.M. Potter, et al .• eds., 
Peasant Society (Boston: Little Brown, 1967); Korean Rural Sociological Association, op. cit.; 
and Seung-Gyu Moon, Changing Korean Society (in Korean, Taegu: Kyongbuk National 
University, 1966). 
30. Kyong-Dong Kim, "A Study of the Confucian Values in Korea," in Collected Papers in 
Lt-mmemoration of Professor Dr. Sangbeck Lee on His 60th Birthday (Seoul: Eulyoo, 1964. 
10 Korean), pp. 333-368. 
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oeipatory decision-making is encouraged and practised, the final authority of the elite is 
seldom questioned. Social status, whether ascribed or achieved, is not to be lightly breach-
ed, even in everyday language. More specifically on the rural village level, there is a 
-deep-rooted disdain for politicians running for election and a general lack of interest in 
the electoral process itself. 31 
It goes without saying that these statements are necessarily sweeping generalizations and 
:some significant changes have been under way in the recent decades, particularly under 
the surging Western influences. The urban, the young, the better educated, and the up-
wardly mobile have been relatively more susceptible to these changes. Nevertheless, insofar 
as the centralized governmental processes and the authoritarian political decision-making 
·are concerned, even these elements have come to accept or tolerate such practices, especi-
.ally if they are wrapped in the nationalistic, collectivistic, and moralistic guise. The rural, 
the old, the less-educated, and the lowly in status, on the other hand, have not only been 
less amenable to the changes but they have shown some degree of annoyance in too much 
of them. To these elements, as long as the political leader and his government seemingly 
is capable of taking care of their livelihood, the political system in itself is less essential 
.and more or less irrelevant. No doubt, they also are strongly inclined to support any 
inorally decent leadership, regardless of the form of government. 32 
Against this backdrop of structural characteristics or pre-conditions, let us now concen-
trate on the more immediate background of rural development efforts in Korea. Korea's 
experience with concrete forms of rural development action programs actually dates back 
to the Japanese period. In 1932, the Japanese colonial authorities launched a movement 
-called the "Self-Help Movement for the Revival of Agriculture" under the banner of 
leading the farmers by spiritual teaching and careful and kindly guidance in forming their 
methods of livelihood. Evidently, this was motivated not so much by genuine concern for 
the farmers of Korea as the Japanese imperialistic interest. And it was never able to 
mobilize the farmers despite their coercive, militaristic techniques. 33 Besides the partially 
:successful land reform program, the fifties saw initiation of two rural development pro-
,grams by the government. One was the establishment of unified government apparatus for 
rural extension services, originally taken over from the U.S. Military administration. And 
the other was inception of Community Development projects in cooperation with the U.S . 
. government. 34 
Even if the present regime of President Park has expanded and improved these pro-
:.grams, particularly the former, their effect has been limited at most and superficial, especi-
.ally in the case of the latter. The crucial defect of these projects and programs may be 
·detected in the lack of the sense of direction and vision in integrated development efforts . 
.Apparently, while concentrating on the incipietlt industrialization path for economic 
.growth, both resources and energy were running out on any substantial rural develop-
.ment plans. It was only in the beginning of the seventies when the economy has reached 
.a level of take-off and been ready for more balanced development that the political leader-
.ship has been able to pay serious attention to the urgency of comprehensive rural devel-
opment. Put it quite bluntly, as would be reasonably expected of any nation struggling to 
take off, it was necessary to put out the fire on your own feet before you began to splash 
water on your neighbor'S. It was under these circumstances that the idea of the Saemaul 
31. Brandt, op. cit. Man-Gap Lee, op. cit. 
32. Ibid. 
33. 'Government General of Chosen, Thriving Chosen'(Korea), (Seoul: 1935). 
34. II Chul Kim, "Rural'Development," in Korean Rural Sociological Society" op. cit .• pp. 
288-292. 
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Undong was conceived and born.35, 
By definition, the Saemaul Undong is a comprehensive social movement, a development 
program, and a community organization effort. As all of these, it would have required 
leadership, ideology or code of values, resources, both human skills of planning and 
material, organizational capacities, recruitment, mobilization, and participation of mem-
bers.36 Theoretically, however, such a movement could have been initiated and implement-
ed by any non-governmental agents. Yet, besides the structural pre-conditions examined 
earlier, which certainly have provided fertile soil for direct governmental intervention, the 
only viable source of all of these requirements still lay in the government. 
It was President Park, himself the national leader, who provided the leadership. No 
one will doubt that Korea has a number of compotent men of ideas among her intel-
lectuals who would have had similar ideas and ideals. But it was President Park who 
commanded resources and organizations, and even the ideas of the intellectuals in the 
position of advising him on these matters. 
Government bureaucracy under his direction was immediately and effectively mobilized 
to embark on a pilot project, to assess its results, and to draw up a master plan for a 
national movement. This is the bureaucracy that has successfully managed three five-year 
economic development plans to accomplish what the world has seen in this nation. It is 
the government, with the aid of the intellecutals, that carries out formulation and disse-
mination of the Saemaul ideology. The government provides necessary financial and 
material investment for the projects of this movement. Various technical training and 
assistance is eminating from the government. The task of coordination and clearinghouse· 
is being performed by a government agency. But mention of government must stop here. 
When it comes to the actual process of selection and implementation of specific projects, 
resource mobilization, and particularly organizational dynamics which is the most essential 
element of this whole movement, the role of government rapidly fades away, as we have 
already described earlier. 
In fact, if one looks at the proportion of investment counting in labor service as well 
as other material contributions in cash and in kind, more than two thirds are drawn from 
the villages themselves, not from the government. Recently, even voluntary contributions 
from public and civil organizations, enterprises, and private citizens flow into the general 
stock of funds for this rural development movement. The share of this type of contribu-
tion may be small (I.4 % of the total investment in 1974), but its significance goes beyond 
the visible material consequences. 37 
Apparently, government cannot do it all; it should not. This restriction is eminently im-
portant for this kind of social movement, one of whose ideals specifically calls for voluntary 
participation of the populace, and one of whose purposes entails inculcation of grass-
roots democracy appropriate to the Korean situation. As the villages move ahead with the 
goal of achieving self-reliance, the role of government is envisioned to diminish significant-
ly. This has already been revealed in our earlier discussion of the typological-sequential 
approach. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
According to the currently available government statistics, as of the end of 1974, all of 
35. Korea Overseas Information Service, op. cit., pp. 8-11. 
36. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class Conflict ill Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1959); R.R. Mayer, Social Planning and Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hail, 1972): and G. Zaltman et. al., eds., Creating Social Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart. 
& Winston, 1972). 
37 .. Ministry of Home Affairs, op. cit. (1974), pp. 52-53. 
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Table 1. The Saemaul UTUlong Accomplishments: 1971-1974. 
Accomplishments Unit 1971 1972 1973 1974 
PartiCipated Villages number 33,267 22,708 34,665 . 34,665 
Participants 1,000 7,220 32,000 62,280 106,852 
Projects 1,000 385 320 1,093 1,099 
Government Support (A) million $ 8.2 7.2 34;2' 61.6 
Total Output (B) million $ 24.4 63.2 192.2 265.6 ' 
Ratio (B/A) times 3.0 8.8 5.6 4.3 
Source: National Agricultural Economics Research Institute, op. cit., p. 29. 
the 34,665 villages in the nation have participated in the Saemaul Undong, involving the 
total number of persons over the four year period of more than 215 million, with the 
annual average of about 54 million people-the 1970 census count of the total population 
in South Korea was 31,435,000. On the average, over 7,000,000 projects were undertaken 
every year, with the total government investment amounting to $11 1,200,000 during that 
interval. The government estimate of the total output from this investment was five times 
in value. 38 
In terms of the sequential re-classification made on the basis of the village typology, 
adjusted annually since 1973, there is a significant shift from the basic, through the self-
helping, to the self-reliant types (Table 2).39 Even though the ratio of the average income 
of farm household to that of urban working family has been gradually rising in the past 
decade, a significant jump in this ratio has been experienced since 197 I, reaching 87.1 % 
by 1973 from 60.1 % in 1967 (Table 3).40 These are some of the objective indicators of the 
direct and indirect consequence of the Saemaul Undong. But even impressionistic observa-
tions of some outside observers, including foreign journalists and scholars, have witnessed 
visible signs of improvement in the rural environment, living standards, and life styles. 41 
Table 2. Number and Proportion of Villages by Developmental Typology 1973-75 
Village Type 
Basic (undeveloped) 
Self-Helping (developing) 
Self-Reliant (developed) 
Total 
*Projected estimates 
1973 
18,415(53.1 %) 
13,943(40.2%) 
2,307(6.7%) 
34,665 
1974 
10,656(30.8%) 
19,763(57.0%) 
4,246(12.2%) 
34,665 
1975* 
6,165(17.8 %) 
21,500(62.0%) 
7,000(20.2 %) 
34,665 
Source: National Agricultural Economics Research Institute, op. cit., p~28; Ministry of InternaJ 
Affairs, Saemaul Undong Korea (Seoul, 1975), p.29. 
Table 3. Average Annual Incomes of Farm and Fishery Households and Urban 
Working Households: 1967-1973 (U.S. $) 
Household Type 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Farm & Fishery (A) 542 637 715 811 952 1072 1242 
Urban Worker (B) 905 1018 1095 1202 1206 1292 1375 
Ratio (A/B:%) 59.9 62.6 65.3 67.5 78.9 83.0 90.3 
Source: Dae-Hwan Kim, op. cit., p.256. 
38. Ibid., pp. 49-53; and National Agricultural Economics Research Institute, op. cit., p.29. 
39. Ibid., p.28. 
40. Ibid., p. 34; and Dae-Hwan Kim, "Interim Evaluation of the Saemaul Undong,'?(in Korean) 
in Office of Planning and Coordination, ed. The Immediate Problems and Long-Term Stra-
tegy for the 1980's (in Korean; Prime Minister's Office, Seoul, 1975). 
41. V. Brandt, "New Community Movement," in Saemaul Undong (Seoul: Seoul Shinmun Dai-
ly, 1973); and Korea Information Service, ed., Korea Seen From Abroad(Seoul. 1975), ch.6. 
KOREA'S SAEMAUL UNDONG -13-
Thus far, only a handful of village level surveys are available. One common thrust of 
findings in all these micro-analytic studies, however, is the unmistakingly high proportion 
of vill!lgers expressing favorable attitudes towards the movement itself, the immediate 
effects' of their specific projects on their living conditions and value-orientations, the need 
for this movement, willingness to participate, and the actual effectiveness of programs. 
Of course, there.is a minority of villagers clearly letting it be known that they are indif-
ferent, disgruntled, and unwilling to cooperate, mainly because many programs have eithe~ 
been superficial, irrelevant to their primary needs, or been unable to muster the necessary 
integrative cooperation of the residents. 42 
Interestingly, a couple of these surveys have reported some systematic variations by the 
type of villages classified not only according to the three development stages but also by 
the socio-economic status level of the respondents. As expected, with respect to most of 
the above mentioned attitudes, the relatively developed, self-reliant villages were reported 
to have larger percentages of respondents with favorable attitudes. 43 Since one survey con-
-tains avery illuminating finding, let us refer ~to it here, in some detail, as an example. This 
survey asked the individuals to assess the effect of various Saemaul projects specifically in 
terms of direct and immediate material physical benefits. Systematic variations have been 
noted in two aspects. While more than two thirds of the upper-economic status respond-
ents, by way of the size of farming, felt that they benefited directly, only a third of farm 
laborers without land gave affirmative answers. The stark difference in the proportion of 
these respondents citing the concrete projects that actually helped them appeared in two 
case~. The upper-class farmers enjoyed greater benefits in the farming area, whereas, a 
greater proportion of the lower-class respondents saw the benefits in the environmental 
improvement programs. The study concludes that this may be due to the emphasis placed 
on the basic environmental betterment projects and due to the necessity for a longer term 
perspective with regard to more economically beneficial programs. 44 
In spite of relatively short time passed since the inception of the movement, signs 
of progress are not scarce. One way of demonstrating this change may be to compare 
some expert evaluations presented in the early phase of the mov~ment and those of fairly 
recent time. In a newspaper account of March 1972, an interim report was compiled by 
the Ministry of Home A,ffairs on the progress of the first year of the Movement. To only 
recount the problems identified in the report, the list is rather lengthy, including: 1) many 
projects tend to be largely formalistic and irrelvant to the objective of raising the farm 
income level; 2) determination of projects often has been so ambitious that some have 
turned out to be over burdensome to the farmers; 3) many of the projects have stopped 
at about 70 % of the proposed objective, chiefly due to shortage of resources; 4) the level 
of participation of the rural populace has been low and passive, consequently benefiting 
intermediary brokers who take over the projects for personal business; 5) the reward system 
based on achievement has led the villages to' engage in sharp competition at the risk of 
hasty completion of projects for cosmetic purposes or burdensome indebtedness to com-
plete them; 6) many villages have experienced friction between the leadership and the resi-
42. National Agricultural Economics Research Institute op. cit ... Hai Kyun Ahn, "Analysis of 
Farmers' Responses on the Policy of Rural Development in Korea," (in Korean) in Korean 
Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 11, No.2 (Seoul: Graduate School of Public Administ-
ration, Seoul National University, 1973); and Environmental Planning Studies Institute, An 
Analysis of the Attitudinal Structure of the Saemaul Movement and Its Guiding Direction 
(Seoul, 1974, in Korean). 
43. Environmental Planning Studies Institute, op. cit., p. 47; and National Agricultural Econo-
mics aesearch Institute, op. cit., pp. 56-61. 
44. Ibid., pp; 62-65. 
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dents because the leaders tended to make arbitrary decisions without consensus of the-
people; 7) some village leaders are forcing the people to engage in projects without suffici-
ent material, capital, or labor supply; 8) by soliciting assistance from sllccessful expatriates 
living in the city, some leaders are implicitly encouraging dependency among the villagers;. 
9) in some local governments, officials have been over-zealous to demonstrate their accom-· 
plishments, thus causing frustration and distrust among the general populace; and 10) 
some civil servants in charge of the Saemaul projects take advantage of their prestigeous 
position to spend tax-payers' time and resources on private endeavors. 45 
Three years later, another expert report, based on a survey analysis, provides the follow-· 
ing generalizations: despite various problems identified earlier, there are signs· of change 
in terms of clearing up the untidy environment, enhancement of the spirit of self-help and 
cooperation, ciosing the gulf between agriculture and industry and gradual eradication of 
the dependency syndrome. Clearly, the Saemaul Undong has been a significant accelerant 
for social and economic change in Korea's rural communities. 46 
Little information is available with regard to the perceived need for the role of govern-· 
ment at this point. The only data appeared in the above mentioned report indicate that 
the most important factor for further success as perceived by the people still is eager 
cooperation by the villagers, followed by leadership, financial support, and governmental 
encouragement. All told, only a third of the respondents seem to feel that more govern-· 
ment involvement is needed, particularly in terms of financial assistance. 47 
Since one would still view the present stage of the movement as an experimental and. 
preliminary one, the prospect seems to be that the government will continue to play an 
active part vis-a-vis financial and technical assistance, guidance and training, oversight 
and coordination, and moral encouragement. Thus far, one of the problems seemingly 
overlooked by the government has to do with the nature of this movement strictly based. 
on the natural village level without regional and national linkages. 
It is true that at the urging of the President, the movement has now spread into urban 
neighborhoods, factories and busineses, labor unions, schools, hospitals, and even in the 
government agencies and military units. This approach beyond the rural communities, 
however, necessarily has been restricted to non-economic, non-material aspects of com-
munity and organizational life. 48 Insofar as the rural sector is concerned, nevertheless, still 
the most urgent development programs are said to be the creation of productive bases in 
the long-run. And this requires political decisions and administrative programs with a view 
to regional and sectorial balancing, economic linkages between the agricultural and indus-· 
trial, rural and urban sectors, through aggressive incomes, price, land tenure and devel 
opment, and financial and marketing policies. 49 All indications are that the Saemau/ 
Undong is making significant stride forward in connection with social mobilization, grass-
roots democracy, attitudinal and value changes, environmental improvement, and to 
some degree rural economic growth. 
One most recent report has indicated that the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery has 
finally drawn up a program to be incorporated into the Fourth Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan (1977-1981). This program is aimed specifically at two objectives. 
First, it provides a framework for income increase in rural areas through the creation of 
45. Dong-A Ilbo (East Asia Daily), March 17, 1972, p. 6; and Ministry of Rome Affairs, op. cit .. 
(1974), pp. 138-144. 
46. National Agricultural Economics Research Institute, op. cit., pp.7-11. 
47. Ibid., p. 77. 
48. Ministry of Rome Affairs, op. cit. (1974), pp. 36-40; and Ministry of Rome Affairs, op. cit. 
(1975). 
49. National Agricultural Economics Research Institute, op. cit., pp. 7-11. 
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productive bases. In achieving this goal, the organizational mechanism entails a regional 
linkage and balance beyond the village level. At the moment, the plan calls for a division 
of agricultural districts on the principle of "the right crops in the right place," taking 
into account the ecological-economic characteristics of each district. And the plans for 
concrete projects are to be drawn for sub-county level, coordinated upward, rather than 
handed down from the central government. 50 
Besides the need for integrated governmental policies to promote linkages and balanced 
development in the economic sense, two sociological issues are to be squarely faced by the 
government.j On the one hand, the apparent collectivitic orientation of the Saemaul 
Undong may create some tension with the general trend of change in the direction of indi-
vidualism. As has been pointed out earlier, despite the traditional structural context which 
embraces some degree of cooperative orientation, more recent social and economic trans-
formations have implicitly or explicitly encouraged atomization of social relationships 
and "individualism-by-default." Under the circumstances, social mobilization obviously 
instigated by the government may be perceived as a coercive measure rather than a volun-
tary mobilization. According to the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance, in order 
to effect behavioral change which will have the consequence of effecting attitude change, 
forced compliance may be used. However, even in the psychology of forced compliance, 
one basic requirement is that the behavior must appear to have been engaged in "free-
ly. "51 This is :the dilemma of voluntarism versus coercion. To insure truly voluntary 
participation in the Saemaul Undong as integrated development, the government leaders 
may need to study this dilemma very carefully, lest it may unwittingly cause either the 
impression of totalitarian approach, or lead to costly social unrest. 
On the other hand, related to this issue is the implication of enhanced strength of the 
grass-roots democracy. The possible ;tension in this case lies between the widespread 
democratic Ipractices on the grass-roots level and the authoritarian rule on the central 
government level. The ideal goal of developing a democratic political culture appropriate to 
the Korean social structure is a commendable one. We believe that imposition of any 
specific form of government upon a country with divergent structural features is not only 
morally unacceptable but impractical. A compassionate humanistic approach may be in 
order in this regard, which will entail true reflection of the wishes of the people and volun-
tary participation in the political decision-making process from the grass-roots all the 
way to the central government. 
If South Korea's Saemaul Undong is pursued with these outlooks in mind, it would 
become a truly indigenous and successful social movement and community development 
of integrated nature, worthy of its ideals. And it could provide a useful perspective on 
the place of a strong government in integrated rural development. 
50. This plan has tentatively divided the country's rural sector into seven large crop districts, 17 
medium crop districts, and 54 small crop districts, embracing all of the 1,471 myon (sub-
county) which will become the base unit of operation. And the coordinating personnel on 
this base unit level will be the chief of industrial section of the myon administrative office, the 
myon agricultural cooperative president, and the agricultural extension officer in charge of 
the myon. Dong-A Ilbo. August 31, 1976. 
51. J. Cooper, "Population C~ntrol and the Psychology of Forced Compliance," Journal of 
Social Issues. Vol. 30, No.4 (1974), pp. 265-277. 
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